In this article we study supermodular functions on finite distributive lattices. Relaxing the assumption that the domain is a powerset of a finite set, we focus on geometrical properties of the polyhedral cone of such functions. Specifically, we generalize the criterion for extremality and study the face lattice of the supermodular cone. An explicit description of facets by the corresponding tight linear inequalities is provided.
Introduction
Supermodular functions, and their duals, submodular functions, play a central rôle in many fields of discrete mathematics, most notably combinatorial optimization (rank function of polymatroids: see, e.g., the monograph of Fujishige [7] ), game theory (characteristic function of transferable utility games: see, e.g., Peleg and Sudhölter [13] ), decision theory (capacity, Choquet expected utility [17] ), lattice theory, etc.
Up to duality, all above examples fall into the category of supermodular games, that is, supermodular functions vanishing at the empty set. They form a polyhedral cone, whose facets have been found by Kuipers et al. [12] . In his 1971 seminal paper, Shapley [18] gave the 37 extreme supermodular games for n = 4 players, and noted that for larger values of n, little can be said. Later, Rosenmüller and Weidner [16] found all extreme supermodular functions by representing each such function as a maximum over shifted additive games. Recently, Studený and Kroupa [20] revisited the problem and provided another characterization of extremality, in a sense dual to the result of Rosenmüller and Weidner, but easier to use.
The aim of this paper is to (re)establish in a more general framework and in a simpler way the above results (together with new ones) describing the cone of supermodular games, taking advantage of classical results on polyhedra. We consider games defined on a finite distributive lattice L, generated by a partial order on the set of players N . The poset induces some relation between the players, which can be interpreted in various ways: precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern [5] ), hierarchy (Grabisch and Xie [10] ), or permission structure (van den Brink and Gilles [4] ). Feasible coalitions of players, i.e., those for which the game is defined, are down-sets on (N, ), and they form a distributive lattice L. By Birkhoff's theorem, every finite distributive lattice is of this form. The standard case L = 2 N is recovered when the poset (N, ) is flat, i.e., when all players are incomparable (no order relation between the players).
A large amount of research has been done concerning games on distributive lattices, as well as on other ordered structures (see a survey in [8] ). Most of them are related to the solution concepts such as Shapley value or the core. However, up to our knowledge, there is no systematic study on the geometric properties of the cone of supermodular games defined on distributive lattices. Note that it is very natural to take a distributive lattice as a domain of a supermodular function since supermodular inequalities involve only the lattice joins and meets. The present paper addresses precisely this point. In the same time we generalize and prove results about extreme rays and facets in a more concise way. Section 2 collects background on distributive lattices. Coalitional games are introduced in Section 3, in particular 0-normalized and supermodular games. Section 4 contains basic facts about 0-normalized supermodular games and the cone thereof. The extreme rays are characterized in Section 5. Basically, a supermodular game generates an extreme ray if and only if a certain system of linear equalities has for a solution those vectors which are proportional to the marginal vectors of the game. Section 6 describes the facial structure of the cone by a certain collection of finite lattices, namely the tight sets associated with compatible permutations of the poset (N, ). The facets of the cone of supermodular games are characterized in Section 7.
Finite distributive lattices
In this section we introduce basic notions and results about Birkhoff duality between finite distributive lattices and finite posets. The reader is referred to [19, Chapter 3] for all the unexplained notions concerning lattices and partially ordered sets (posets).
Let L be a finite distributive lattice whose join and meet are denoted by ∨ and ∧, respectively. A partial order on L is defined by a b if
Since L is finite there exists a top element ⊤ and a bottom element ⊥ in L. We always assume that L is non-trivial in sense that ⊤ = ⊥. An element a ∈ L is called join-irreducible if a = ⊥ and the identity a = b ∨ c holding for some b, c ∈ L implies a = b or a = c. In particular, a ∈ L with a = ⊥ is an atom if the condition b a for all b ∈ L implies b = ⊥ or b = a. The join-irreducible elements of a Boolean lattice are precisely its atoms. For any a, b ∈ L such that a b, we define an order interval
An element a ∈ L is join-irreducible if, and only if, there is a unique a − ∈ L such that a − a, a − = a, and [a − , a] = {a − , a}. The set of all joinirreducible elements of L is denoted by J (L) and it is always endowed with the partial order of L restricted to J (L). Thus, (J (L), ) becomes a nonempty finite poset.
Let N = ∅ be a finite set and be a partial order on N . A down-set in (N, ) is a subset A ⊆ N such that if i ∈ A and j i for j ∈ N , then j ∈ A. For any i ∈ N , we denote
Both ↓ i and ⇓ i are down-sets in (N, ). A down-set A is called principal if there exists some i ∈ N such that A = ↓ i. By D(N, ) we denote the set of all down-sets in (N, ). It is easy to see that D(N, ) is closed under the set-theoretic union ∪ and intersection ∩. Thus, D(N, ) is a finite distributive lattice whose order is the inclusion ⊆ between sets, and whose top and bottom element is N and ∅, respectively. The lattice D(N, ) is the most general example of a finite distributive lattice by the following classical result.
Birkhoff 's representation theorem. Let L be a finite distributive lattice. Then the mapping 
Coalitional games on finite distributive lattices
We use the standard terminology of cooperative game theory; see [13] . The player set is defined to be N := {1, . . . , n}, for some integer n ≥ 1. Any subset of N is called a coalition. We allow for a situation in which players i, j ∈ N are compared using a partial order on N . Hence, (N, ) is assumed to be a finite poset. Birkhoff duality (see Section 2) entails that the partial order on N restricts the formation of coalitions A ⊆ N , provided that the coalition structure is modeled by the lattice of down-sets in (N, ).
Convention. Throughout the paper we will always assume that the set of all possible coalitions in (N, ) is the lattice of down-sets D(N, ). We use the abbreviations
and J := J (D(N, ) ).
From now on, all possible coalitions are assumed to be precisely the sets belonging to a fixed lattice L and J denotes its subset of all join-irreducible elements. Coalitional games are modeled as real functions v on the set L of feasible coalitions A, where the real value v(A) indicate the amount of utility resulting from the joint cooperation of players in the coalition A.
Let G(L) be the set of all games on L. We consider these subsets of G(L):
A modular game is also called a valuation (over R) in literature; see [2, 19] . Note that G(L) is a real vector space isomorphic to R L\{∅} and therefore dim G(L) = |L| − 1. One of the bases in G(L) is found very easily. For each nonempty A ∈ L, the unanimity game u A is defined by
Then {u A | ∅ = A ∈ L} forms a basis in G(L). The coordinates of any game v ∈ G(L) with respect to this basis are calculated using the Möbius inversion formula [14] . Specifically, the Möbius function of L is the function
where the sum above is over all C ∈ L such that [C, B] is a Boolean sublattice of L.
Proof. It suffices to apply the observation from [19, Example 3.9.6]. Specifically, since the lattice L is finite and distributive, the formula for Möbius function µ L simplifies as
The set of valuations (modular games) G M (L) is a vector subspace of G(L). By Rota's lemma [15] any valuation on L is uniquely determined by its restriction to the set of join-irreducible elements J . It follows that the dimension of linear space G M (L) equals |J | = n. This means that the polyhedral cone of supermodular games G S (L) is not pointed as it includes the non-trivial linear space G M (L). However, we can always consider the elements of
To this end we introduce the following notion.
Let G ⋆ (L) be the set of all 0-normalized games on L.
Note that the notion of 0-normalized game on a distributive lattice L coincides with the usual concept of 0-normalized game in cooperative game theory (see [ 
It is easy to see that
Indeed, it suffices to define w := v ⋆ , m := B∈Jv (B) · u B , and observe that
is monotone and nonnegative. Proof. Since a monotone game is necessarily nonnegative, it suffices to check monotonicity. We only need to prove that for all A, B ∈ L satisfying B ⊆ A and |B| = |A| − 1, the inequality v(B) ≤ v(A) holds. Since both A and B are down-sets in (N, ), any such B is necessarily of the form B = A \ {i}, where i is a maximal element of A in (N, ). Note that ↓ i ⊆ A and
Since v is 0-normalized and
By the decomposition (3.2) we can now write G S (L) as the direct sum of cones,
Specifically, the identity (3.
is a pointed polyhedral cone, it is generated by its finitely-many extreme rays.
In the next section we present a simple linear-algebraic criterion to test if a given 0-normalized supermodular game generates an extreme ray of G ⋆ S (L). Our result automatically yields a criterion for extremality of games in G S (L): we say that a supermodular
is extreme if, and only if, the smallest face of G S (L) to which v belongs is an atom of the face lattice of G S (L). Indeed, faces of G S (L) are in one-to-one correspondence with
The cone of supermodular games
A payoff vector is any vector x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n . We define
and we always assume x(∅) := 0. The core of v ∈ G(L) is a convex polyhedron
The elements of the core C(v) have the standard game-theoretic interpretation. Namely, no payoff vector x ∈ C(v) can be improved upon by any coalition A ∈ L. In contrast with cores of games over Boolean lattices, the core of games over distributive lattices can be an unbounded polyhedron. In fact, assume Recall that we always assume that N is partially ordered by . In addition we also equip N with the total order of natural numbers ≤, so that (N, ≤) becomes a chain. We say that a permutation π of N is compatible with (N, ) if π −1 is an order-preserving map from (N, ) onto (N, ≤) . Here, the intended reading is that i is a rank of player π(i). Define Π := {π | π is a permutation compatible with (N, )} .
Compatible permutations are in bijection with maximal chains in L. Put A π 0 := ∅ and A π i := {π (1), . . . , π(i)} for each i ∈ N . Then, with each π ∈ Π we associate a maximal chain C π := {A π i | i ∈ N ∪ {0}}. Conversely, starting from a maximal chain {A 0 , . . . , A n } in L, where A 0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ A n , there is clearly a unique π ∈ Π such that A i = A π i for each i ∈ N ∪ {0}. A marginal vector of v ∈ G(L) and π ∈ Π is the vector x v,π ∈ R n whose coordinates are defined as
It follows directly from the definition of marginal vector that
We will make an ample use of the following identity derived from (4.2):
For any v ∈ G(L) and π ∈ Π we define
Each coalition A ∈ T π (v) is said to be tight with respect to v and π. Note that as a consequence of (4.3), the following inclusion holds:
Theorem 4.1. Let L be a finite distributive lattice and v ∈ G(L). Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. The equivalence of the first three items is well known; see [9, Theorem 3 .27]. We show that 4. implies 2. Let σ ∈ Π . Then, for all A ∈ L,
By (4.3) we have x v,σ (N ) = v(N ). From 2. to 4. It suffices to show that for each A ∈ L there exists π ∈ Π such that v(A) = x v,π (A). Clearly, we can always find a maximal chain C π in L such that A ∈ C π for some π ∈ Π . Then (4.3) yields v(A) = x v,π (A).
Remark 4.1. Many other characterizations of supermodularity can be found in the literature in case that L is a Boolean lattice. See [20, Appendix A] for a comprehensive list of such conditions. In particular, the implication from 2. to 1. was proved by Ichiishi in [11] . The necessary and sufficient conditions involving specific marginal vectors can be found in [21] .
Given v ∈ G(L) let x v : Π → R n be defined by
Further, we consider a mapping x :
As in [20] we call x the payoff-array transformation.
Lemma 4.1. The payoff-array transformation x is linear and injective.
Proof. Linearity is a direct consequence of the identities x v+w,π = x v,π +x w,π and x αv,π = αx v,π , which are true for every v, w ∈ G(L), all α ∈ R and all π ∈ Π . Assume that v, w ∈ G(L) satisfy x v = x w and let A ∈ L. Then there exists a permutation π ∈ Π such that A ∈ C π . It follows from (4.3) and from the assumption that
Hence, x is injective.
We describe the range of payoff-array transformation x on the set of 0-normalized games. For any mapping y : Π → R n we denote y π := y(π) ∈ R n , for all π ∈ Π . Lemma 4.2. Let y : Π → R n . The following are equivalent:
1. There is a unique game v ∈ G ⋆ (L) such that y = x v . 2. These conditions are satisfied:
Proof. Let y = x v for some v ∈ G ⋆ (L). The equality in ( †) is a direct consequence of (4.3) since, for any π, σ ∈ Π satisfying A ∈ C π ∩ C σ , we get
Further, let π ∈ Π and i ∈ N satisfy ↓ i ∈ C π . Put A := ↓ i and observe that A ∈ J by Proposition 2.1. This implies that the unique predecessor of A in L is A − = A \ {i} and A − ∈ C π , by maximality of the chain C π . We obtain y
where the third equality follows from (4. By the definition, y = x v . It remains to verify that v is 0-normalized. Let A ∈ J . By Proposition 2.1 it follows that A = ↓ i for a unique i ∈ N . There exists some compatible permutation π satisfying A ∈ C π . Hence, by the definition of v and ( † †),
This means that v is 0-normalized and the proof is finished.
Remark 4.2.
A mapping y : Π → R n , whose special case is the payoffarray transformation x, can be viewed as a finite collection of possibly repeating points in R n labeled by permutations. This interpretation appears in [3] , where a map y from a finite set into R n is termed a point configuration.
Main result
The main theorem gives a simple criterion how to recognize extreme games among all 0-normalized supermodular games. then y = αx v , for some α ∈ R.
We prepare a lemma to be used in the proof of Theorem 5.1. For any v ∈ G(L), put
where A||B means A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A.
For any point configuration y : Π → R n and a game v ∈ G(L), we consider the following property: Proof. Assume that y satisfies ( * ) and ( * * ). It is easy to see that ( †) and ( † †) are true. In order to prove (5.2), let {A, B} ∈ F v , π, σ ∈ Π , and A ∩ B, B, A ∪ B ∈ C π , A ∈ C σ . Since
we get A ∈ T π (v). Hence, A ∈ T π (v) ∩ C σ and ( * ) says that y π (A) = y σ (A).
Proof. (of Theorem 5.1) Let v ∈ G ⋆ S (L) be nonzero. We need to show that v is extreme if and only if the following inclusion holds true: 
where F v is as in (5.1). Thus, extremality of v is equivalent to the condition
Putting x(G(v)) := {x w | w ∈ G(v)} and using Lemma 4.1, it is immediate that (5.4) holds if and only if
We claim that
Let y satisfies ( †), ( † †), and (5.2). Lemma 4.2 provides a unique w ∈ G ⋆ (L) such that y = x w . We need to verify that w ∈ G(v). To this end, let {A, B} ∈ F v . Pick permutations π, σ ∈ Π such that A ∩ B, B, A ∪ B ∈ C π and A ∈ C σ . Then (5.2) shows that
Hence, w ∈ G(v). Finally, from (5.5), (5.6), and Lemma 5.1 we get (5.3), and the proof is finished.
We will apply Theorem 5.1 to the cone of supermodular games on the distributive lattice L from Example 2.1. The computations were carried out in the package Convex for Maple [6] .
is embedded into R 9 and its dimension is 5. It has 6 extreme rays. We will enumerate their minimal integer generators. The parentheses and commas are omitted for the sake of brevity in what follows. Whenever v i (A) is missing, we put v i (A) := 0.
• v 1 (24) = v 1 (234) = v 1 (N ) = 1.
• v 2 (34) = v 2 (234) = v 2 (N ) = 1.
• v 4 (234) = v 4 (N ) = 1.
• v 6 (N ) = 1.
We will check that v 1 is extreme using Theorem 5.1. Since there are 8 maximal chains in L, there are 8 compatible permutations: π 1 = (2314), π 2 = (2341), π 3 = (2431), π 4 = (3241), π 5 = (3241), π 6 = (3421), π 7 = (4231), and π 8 = (4321). Let I 1 := {1, . . . , 5} and I 2 := {6, 7, 8}. There are only 2 marginal vectors associated with v 1 ,
This means that the tight sets are
Hence, the conditions ( * ) and ( * * ) for y : Π → R 4 are in the form of linear equalities, for all i ∈ I 1 and j ∈ I 2 :
(5.10)
(5.11)
The linear system above has a unique solution up to a real multiple. Observe that y
, for all i ∈ I 1 and j ∈ I 2 , as a consequence of (5.7), (5.8), and (5.10). Let α ∈ R. Then necessarily y = αx v 1 . Thus, v 1 is extreme by Theorem 5.1.
Remark 5.1. It is natural to ask for a game-theoretic meaning of the extreme supermodular games. Since the supermodular cone is finitely-generated, every supermodular game is a conic combination of the extreme ones. There are important solution concepts [13] , such as the core or Shapley value, which are linear maps on the supermodular cone. Hence, such solution concepts preserve every conic combination of supermodular games. From this viewpoint, extreme supermodular games play the role of basic building block since they fully determine values of any linear solution concept on the supermodular cone.
Faces and core structure
Let Φ(G S (L)) be the face lattice of G S (L), that is, the family of all nonempty faces of G S (L) ordered by inclusion ⊆. In what follows we will describe the structure of this face lattice. For any subset G ⊆ G S (L) we define
the smallest face containing G. Join ∨ and meet ∧ in Φ(G S (L)) are computed as
For any face F , let relint F be the relative interior of
, the bottom is ∅, and the join and the meet are given by
The following lemma describes the relation between tight sets of v ∈ G S (L) and faces of G S (L).
The following holds.
, π ∈ Π , and A, B ∈ T π (v) with A||B. It is well known that T π (v) is closed under union and intersection for supermodular games. Hence, the equality
Since A||B, we get A ∈ T π (v) \ C π .
Games in G S (L) belong to the same face if and only if they possess identical structure of their tight sets. Precisely:
The following are equivalent.
Proof. Let v, w ∈ relint F for some F ∈ Φ(G S (L)). If they are linearly dependent, then the statement is trivial. Assume that v and w are linearly independent and let L be the unique line in the linear space
Let π ∈ Π and A ∈ T π (v). By linearity (Lemma 4.1) we get
Since x u,π ∈ C(u) and x u ′ ,π ∈ C(u ′ ), this implies x u,π (A) = u(A) and
This proves the inclusion T π (v) ⊆ T π (w). The opposite inclusion is established analogously.
To prove the converse, assume T π (v) = T π (w) for all π ∈ Π . It suffices to show that F v = F w , where F v is as in (5.1), since this already implies existence of a unique F ∈ Φ(G S (L)) such that v, w ∈ relint F . First, we prove
Let {A, B} ∈ F v . There exists π ∈ Π such that A ∩ B, A, A ∪ B ∈ C π . Hence, A ∈ T π (v) and
which means B ∈ T π (v) = T π (w). Then A, B ∈ T π (w), and by Lemma 6.1 (1) {A, B} ∈ F w , so (6.1) holds. The proof of inclusion
Let S(L) be the lattice of all sublattices of L ordered by set inclusion ⊆. The core structure of v ∈ G S (L) (cf. [12] and [20, Definition 4] ) is the mapping T (v) : Π → S(L) defined as
The above definition is correct since T π (v) is a lattice as a consequence of Lemma 6.1. By Proposition 6.1, T (v) = T (w) for all v, w ∈ relint F . Hence, we may define a mapping
We will order the elements of S(L) Π by the product order ⊆ inherited from S(L). Specifically, for any U , V ∈ S(L) Π ,
Proposition 6.2. The mapping T is injective, order-reversing, and its inverse T −1 is also order-reversing.
Proof. T injective is an easy consequence of Proposition 6.1. We will prove that T is an order-reversing map. Let F 1 ⊆ F 2 be faces of G S (L) and select arbitrarily v 1 ∈ relint F 1 and v 2 ∈ relint F 2 . We want to show
Let π ∈ Π and A ∈ T π (v 2 ). Using (4.1), this is equivalent to saying that v 2 is a solution of the equation in v:
As this equation is satisfied by all games in relint F 2 and only these ones, it follows that (6.3) is implied by the equalities determining relint F 2 , that is, those corresponding to F v 2 . As F 1 ⊆ F 2 , relint F 1 is determined by a superset of equalities, and therefore the equality (6.3) is also satisfied by
for all π ∈ Π , where v 1 ∈ relint F 1 and v 2 ∈ relint F 2 , for some faces F 1 and F 2 . We will prove that F 2 ⊆ F 1 , which is the same as
Then there exists π s.t. A ∩ B, A, A ∪ B ∈ C π . Hence, by Lemma 6.1 (2), B ∈ T π (v 1 ) \ C π , hence B ∈ T π (v 2 ) \ C π . As A ∈ C π ⊆ T π (v 2 ) and A B, by Lemma 6.1 (1), {A, B} ∈ F v 2 .
Corollary 6.1. T is a lattice isomorphism from the face lattice Φ(G S (L)) onto a sublattice of S(L) Π .
Remark 6.1. The same reasoning can be applied to the face lattice of all 0-normalized supermodular games, Φ(G ⋆ S (L)). Indeed, it follows from the direct sum decomposition (3.3) that Φ(G ⋆ S (L)) and Φ(G S (L)) are isomorphic lattices. whose sum gives (7.5). Second, we prove that no inequality of type (7.2) is redundant. It is clearly sufficient to prove the result for the Boolean lattice L = 2 N . Consider 
